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KILLER APPS: VANISHING MESSAGES,
ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS, AND
CHALLENGES TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAWS
WHEN PUBLIC OFFICIALS “GO DARK”
Dr. Daxton R. Stewart1

ABSTRACT
Government officials such as White House staffers and the Missouri governor have
been communicating among themselves and leaking to journalists using apps such
as Signal and Confide, which allow users to encrypt messages or to make them
vanish after they are received. By using these apps, government officials are "going
dark" by avoiding detection of their communications in a way that undercuts
freedom of information laws. This article explores the challenges presented by
government employee use of encrypted and ephemeral messaging apps by
examining three policy approaches: (1) banning use of the apps, (2) enhancing
existing archiving and record-keeping practices, or (3) legislatively expanding
quasi-government body definitions. Each of these approaches will be analyzed as
potential ways to manage the threat presented by “killer apps” to open records laws.
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INTRODUCTION
In Donald J. Trump’s first month in the White House, staffers concerned
about accusations of leaking information to the press “resorted to a secret chat app
– Confide – that erases messages as soon as they’re read.”2 After the email hacks
that haunted Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign in 2016, the Confide app
became “the tool of choice for Republicans in Washington” fearing a similar fate.3
White House press secretary Sean Spicer, who began random phone checks shortly
after the Washington Post revelation, reportedly told staffers that using Confide and
the encrypted messaging app Signal were potential violations of the Presidential
Records Act.4 In response to these reports, the House Oversight Committee issued
a letter to fifty-five federal agencies expressing concerns that the use of Signal,
Confide, and WhatsApp by federal employees “could result in the creation of
federal records that would be unlikely or impossible to preserve” and may allow
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Ashley Parker & Philip Rucker, Upheaval is Now Standard Operating Procedure Inside the
White House, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/upheaval-isnow-standard-operating-procedure-inside-the-white-house/2017/02/13/d65dee58-f213-11e6-a9b0ecee7ce475fc_story.html?utm_term=.b1940d392beb.
3
David McCabe & Jonathan Swan, Confide: The App for Paranoid Republicans, AXIOS, (Feb. 8,
2017), https://www.axios.com/confide-the-new-app-for-paranoid-republicans-2246297664.html.
4
Annie Karni & Alex Isenstadt, Sean Spicer Targets Own Staff in Leak Crackdown, POLITICO
(Feb. 26, 2017, 5:25 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/sean-spicer-targets-own-staffin-leak-crackdown-235413.
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“circumventing requirements established by federal recordkeeping and
transparency laws.”5 Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW)
filed suit against Trump, alleging violation of the Presidential Records Act by using
encrypted disappearing-messaging apps.6 During ethics training in 2018, White
House lawyers advised personnel not to use encrypted messaging apps such as
WhatsApp while conducting government business.7
Similar issues have trickled down to the states as well. In Missouri, two
attorneys sued then-Governor Eric Greitens, arguing that his use of Confide
violated the state’s public records law.8 A county judge denied their request for a
temporary restraining order to halt Greitens’s use of Confide, in part, because of a
lack of evidence that he had been using it to conduct government business, but
noted that there were “a whole bunch of open questions here,” including whether
the governor has a First Amendment right to use the app to communicate, as his
attorneys contended.9
State open records laws, the federal Freedom of Information Act, and the
Presidential Records Act are intended to protect the public’s right to know about
government officials’ conduct. However, the development of privacy-protecting
mobile applications that deliberately make archiving and retrieval difficult creates
a unique challenge for these transparency laws.
Vanishing message apps, such as Snapchat and Confide, allow public
officials, using these apps as intended, to have messages disappear automatically
without a way to keep a record for public inspection. Bob Freeman, the long-time
executive director of New York state’s Committee on Open Government, described
5

Letter from Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, and Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking Member, House of
Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, to Kathleen McGettigan,
Acting Director, Office of Personnel Management (Mar. 8, 2017), https://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/2017-03-08-JEC-EEC-to-McGettigan-OPM-Federal-Records-Act-due-322.pdf
6
Josh Gerstein, Judge Hears Suit on Trump White House Use of Encrypted Apps, POLITICO (Jan.
17, 2018, 1:12 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/17/white-house-encrypted-appshearing-343774.
7
Carol D. Leonnig, Josh Dawsey & Ashley Parker, Ethics Training Reminds White House Staff
Not to Use Encrypted Messages for Government Business, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ethics-training-reminds-white-house-staff-not-to-useencrypted-messages-for-government-business/2018/02/04/7636265c-05eb-11e8-94e8e8b8600ade23_story.html?utm_term=.0d04a080becd.
8
Cyrus Farivar, Judge Should Order Governor to Stop Using Ephemeral App, Lawyers Say,
ARSTECHNICA (Feb. 1, 2018, 6:03 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/02/lawyersgovernors-secret-messaging-app-use-violates-public-records-laws/.
9
Jason Hancock, No Immediate Ban on Greitens’ Use of Secret Text App, but Judge Has More
Questions, KAN. CITY STAR (Feb. 2, 2018), http://www.kansascity.com/news/politicsgovernment/article198113764.html.
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the dangers: “If an individual, including a government official, wants to cover his
tracks, tell the world, ‘I never said that,’ or that he never communicated with a
certain person…Snapchat, for better or worse, can be used to make it seem true.
And there may be nothing we can do about it.”10
Encrypted messaging apps, such as WhatsApp and Signal, offer a similar
challenge, one that former FBI Director James Comey has called “Going Dark.”
Comey, speaking about the challenges of investigating and preventing crime when
people have the ability to use technology to obscure themselves and their activities,
largely through encryption, has said, “We have the legal authority to intercept and
access communications pursuant to a court order, but we often lack the technical
ability to do so.”11
The same legal communication tools that citizens can use to avoid detection
and surveillance are also available to government employees, who now appear to
be “going dark” in their communications as part of their official jobs. This is not
the first time a new digital communication technology has created a challenge for
government record-keeping and accessibility under open records laws. But, in the
past, such new technologies – email, private online chat rooms, text messaging, and
private messaging through social networks, to name a few – merely offered
obscurity as a secondary effect of the messaging system. Ultimately, the messages
could be found and subjected to public scrutiny, though doing so may be difficult
and time-consuming, and new rules have had to be put in place to account for
archiving and providing a means of access to the public.
However, apps such as Snapchat and Confide provide automatic deletion of
messages after they are read as a core benefit. Similarly, encrypted messaging
systems make transparency difficult because people seeking access to those records
would need the key to be able to read them. These features have the potential to be
deadly to public records laws, providing an easy way for government officials to
dodge public scrutiny without any trace of their subversion.
The purpose of this article is to examine the implications of vanishing
messaging and encrypted messaging apps for freedom of information laws and to
propose potential policy revisions to handle the challenges these apps present. After
briefly reviewing how the apps work, three potential policy approaches are
examined, using legal research methodology to consider the possible remedies that
may be available to legislators and regulators to prevent “killer apps” from
Robert J. Freeman, In a “Poof,” Snapchat Puts Public Records Laws to Test, KNOXVILLE NEWS
SENTINEL (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.knoxnews.com/story/opinion/valleyviews/2016/03/15/poof-snapchat-puts-public-records-laws-test/81656774/.
11
Brookings Institution, Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course?,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A8BSr3XqVwE.
10
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undermining the goals of freedom of information laws. Finally, these policy
approaches are reviewed for their potential application to the Public Information
Act, the open records law in Texas.
I. PRIVACY-PROMISING TECHNOLOGIES
At issue are two distinct kinds of communication technology, encryption
and ephemeral messaging, that allow users to make records of their discussions
harder to observe or retain. Jasmine McNealy and Heather Schoenberger have
conceptualized these as “privacy-promising technologies,” a definition that
includes “technology, such as apps, software, and online tools, in which the maker
or creator uses the promise of privacy, or data control, to induce users to use their
digital tool.”12 While the authors were writing primarily about apps that either
promised anonymity (such as YikYak or Whisper) or provided automatic message
deletion (such as Snapchat), it makes sense as a concept to extend the definition to
apps that protect user communications from outside scrutiny through encryption as
well.
Government use of impermanent messaging apps is becoming
commonplace. Presidential contenders Jeb Bush, Hillary Clinton, and Bernie
Sanders had Snapchat accounts, and the app has become popular among members
of Congress, including “Snapchat King of Congress” Eric Swalwell, a
representative from California.13
Snapchat users include Washington, D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser and Los
Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti,14 as well as Chicago Police Superintendent Eddie
Johnson.15 And government use has not been without controversy. The New York
Police Department, for instance, had to investigate an officer who posted images
on Snapchat during a Brooklyn apartment raid. The posted Snapchats depicted a
family in handcuffs with captions such as “Merry Christmas it’s NYPD!” and
“Warrant Sweeps it’s still a part smh.”16 Beyond the White House examples

12

Jasmine McNealy & Heather Schoenberger, Reconsidering Privacy-Promising Technologies, 19
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2-3 (2016).
13
Taylor Lorenz, How Rep. Eric Swalwell Became the Snapchat King of Congress, THE HILL
(Apr. 27, 2016), http://thehill.com/homenews/news/277737-swalwell-snapchat.
14
Eric Hal Schwartz, Why DC’s Mayor Joined Snapchat, DC INNO (Apr. 11, 2016),
http://dcinno.streetwise.co/2016/04/11/dc-mayor-muriel-bowser-joins-snapchat-social-media/.
15
Kim Janssen, Snapchat Is No Snap for Chicago’s Old School Top Cop, CHI. TRIB. (June 21,
2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chicagoinc/ct-eddie-johnson-snapchat-20160621story.html.
16
Shachar Peled, NYPD Suspends Cop who Allegedly Posted Snapchat of Handcuffed Family,
CNN (Dec. 26, 2016, 9:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/26/us/snapchat-arrest-trnd/.
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mentioned above, public officials have also been using encryption apps in other
contexts. The mayor and city attorney of Chattanooga, Tennessee, for instance, both
admitted using WhatsApp to communicate for government business purposes,
drawing the attention of transparency advocates.17
However, legal research on these privacy-promising technologies has not
yet extended into their implications for transparency laws such as the federal
Freedom of Information Act and state open records laws. Below, encryption and
ephemeral messaging are briefly described in terms of function and legal analysis
to date.
A. Encryption Tools
For centuries, cryptography has existed as a way to transmit messages that
are only decipherable to the intended receiver, and are indecipherable to an
interceptor. Modern encryption technology intends to keep electronic data and
communications safe from interception and surveillance by third parties.18 Simply
put, encryption allows its users to restrict who can read a message to those who
have the key. Encryption tools, such as PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) and GPG (Gnu
Privacy Guard), allow users to create encryption keys for email platforms. This
allows users to communicate without fear that someone without a key can intercept
and read their communications. Edward Snowden used GPG to contact Micah Lee,
a technologist for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, who helped Snowden connect
with documentary journalist Laura Poitras. They used GPG encryption to protect
their communications and ultimately to facilitate the leak of National Security
Agency documents that revealed illegal spying practices.19
In the past few years, encryption tools have become simpler to use through
the development of smartphone apps. Signal, launched in 2013 by Open Whisper
Systems, allows encrypted communications via text messages through an “idiotproof interface, which . . . is just as straightforward as normal calling and texting.”20
17

Paul Leach, Chattanooga Mayor Admits Using Encrypted Messaging App to Converse with
Staff, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Sept. 27, 2016),
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2016/sep/27/mayor-andy-berke-admits-usingencrypted-messa/388807/.
18
Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, Encryption Workarounds, 106 GEO. L. J. 989, 993 (2018).
19
Micah Lee, Ed Snowden Taught Me to Smuggle Secrets Past Incredible Danger. Now I Teach
You, INTERCEPT (Oct. 28, 2014, 1:36 PM), https://theintercept.com/2014/10/28/smugglingsnowden-secrets/.
20
Andy Greenberg, Signal, the Snowden-approved Crypto App, Comes to Android, WIRED (Nov.
2, 2015, 8:06 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/11/signals-snowden-approved-phone-crypto-appcomes-to-android/.
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Instead of the key exchange in PGP and GPG, all Signal requires is that users accept
invitations from other users through their phone numbers, and the app encrypts their
messages. By password-protecting their phones, users provide the first layer of
protection; somebody hoping to access the conversations on Signal must guess or
hack the phone passcode to access the app. Signal itself keeps no records of the
communications that could be demanded by government or other third parties. The
chat app WhatsApp, the most popular chat app worldwide with more than 1 billion
users, adopted Open Whisper Systems’s Signal technology to provide encryption
by default for its users starting in 2014 on Apple devices, and extended to all users
by 2016.21
By default, Signal and WhatsApp provide end-to-end encryption, placing
keys “solely in the hands of device holders” in a way that “significantly disrupts
traditional forms of surveillance that have relied on third parties’
(telecommunication providers and ISPs) having access to communications content,
at least in most circumstances.”22 The main way for the government to access the
information on these devices is by getting a “backdoor” from the tech company that
develops the encryption software. The companies are reluctant to provide
“backdoor[s]” in the name of protecting their users’ privacy. 23 Most famously, in
2016, Apple resisted a Justice Department request to decrypt the iPhone belonging
to a terrorist attack suspect in San Bernardino, California. The government’s move
drew the opposition of “[a]lmost every major technology company…including
Facebook, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, AT&T, and Twitter.”24 Nearly
every Justice Department effort to compel Apple to decrypt its devices, including
obtaining a court order requiring decryption, failed to achieve Apple’s compliance.

21

Ellen Nakashima, WhatsApp, the Messaging Service, Announces Full Encryption on all
Platforms, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/whatsapp-the-messaging-service-announces-full-encryption-on-allplatforms/2016/04/05/80f071f6-fb3e-11e5-9140e61d062438bb_story.html?utm_term=.11e0fdac6186.
22
Stephanie K. Pell, You Can’t Always Get What You Want: How Will Law Enforcement Get What
It Needs in a Post-CALEA, Cybersecurity-Centric Encryption Era?, 17 N.C. J. OF L. & TECH. 599,
625 (2016).
23
Kerr and Schneier detail six different ways of the government breaking encryption for law
enforcement purposes: “find the key, guess the key, compel the key, exploit a flaw in the
encryption scheme, access plaintext when the device is in use, and locate a plaintext copy.” See
Kerr & Schneier, supra note 17 at 22 (suggesting that a backdoor is a way of exploiting a flaw in
encryption).
24
Id. at 38.
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Ultimately, the Justice Department turned to paying private hackers about $1
million to access the information.25
Encryption tools can be described as “dual use” technologies with both
positive and negative functions.26 Kerr and Schneier discuss how criminals may use
encryption technology to conceal evidence, but the government often uses the same
technology to “maintain the privacy of valuable government data,” and thwart
criminal efforts to break the encryption.27 Similarly, these tools can be and have
been used to enable encrypted communications involving government officials,
which triggers potential issues under open government laws.
B. Ephemeral Messaging Apps
The innovation of disappearing messaging launched Snapchat from a
startup in 2011 to one of the most popular social media apps today, with an average
of 158 million daily users by the end of 2016.28 Snapchat’s key feature is that a user
can send images and captions that vanish after viewing, challenging the notion that
whatever is posted online is permanent.29 Snapchat users frown upon subverting
the disappearing nature of photos through taking screenshots or otherwise capturing
photos before they vanish, one of the “unwritten rules” of the platform.30 Snapchat
notifies users when someone has taken a screenshot of a photo or video. Snapchat’s
community guidelines note, “it’s okay with us if someone takes a screenshot, but
we can’t speak for you or your friends.”31 The disappearing message feature has

25

Ellen Nakashima, FBI Paid Professional Hackers One-Time Fee to Crack San Bernardino
iPhone, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/fbi-paid-professional-hackers-one-time-fee-to-crack-san-bernardinoiphone/2016/04/12/5397814a-00de-11e6-9d3633d198ea26c5_story.html?utm_term=.806637c69a3d.
26
Kerr & Schneier, supra note 17, at 995.
27
Id.
28
Michael J. de la Merced & Katie Benner, Snapchat Parent Showcases Its Strength in
Preparation for I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/business/dealbook/snapchat-ipo-nyse.html.
29
Haley Tsukayama, Snapchat Processes 150 Million Images Per Day, WASH. POST (Apr. 16,
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/snapchat-handles-150-millionimages-per-day/2013/04/16/6732c3f0-a69f-11e2-83023c7e0ea97057_story.html?utm_term=.436f15e5c542.
30
Kevin Smith, These Are The 17 Most Annoying Things On Snapchat, BUZZFEED (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/kevinsmith/17-unwritten-rules-ofsnapchat?utm_term=.luY4X0AYD#.jizDkgmYV.
31
Community Guidelines, SNAPCHAT, https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/a/guidelines (last
visited Mar. 28, 2017).
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become so popular that other platforms are introducing similar features, such as
Instagram’s direct messaging system.32
The Confide app, which became popular among White House staffers in the
early days of the Trump administration,33 combines both encryption and ephemeral
messaging features. As the developers note, Confide “uses military-grade end-toend encryption to keep your messages safe and ensure they can only be read by the
intended recipients” and is “ephemeral” by making messages “disappear forever
after they are read once” and protecting them against screenshots.34 As the attorneys
trying to prevent Missouri Gov. Greitens from using Confide argued, “Confide has
a singular purpose. To shred. To destroy. To destroy communications sent and
received.”35
One benefit of an “ephemeral conduit” like Snapchat is that it provides
online obscurity to users that is not otherwise available through social networking
tools.36 Jonathan Moore referred to Snapchat and similar apps as “ephemeral” or
“impermanent social media.” Because the messages are ephemeral, using them as
evidence in litigation presents a challenge to the courts.37
While legal research on ephemeral messaging has touched on privacy
implications and evidence, research has not yet analyzed the ramifications on
government record-keeping and freedom of information laws. The next section
presents law and policy considerations of ephemeral and encrypted messaging apps
in the context of freedom of information laws.
II. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW AND POLICY APPROACHES
The core purpose of freedom of information laws is to provide citizens
access to government records, including communications between public
employees, as a means of ensuring transparency. The core purpose of encryption
Natalie Jervey, Snapchat vs. Instagram: Who’s Copying Whom Most?, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec.
1, 2016, 7:00 AM PST), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/snapchat-instagram-whoscopying-951224.
33
Lily Hay Newman, Encryption Apps Help White House Staffers Leak – And Maybe Break the
Law, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2017, 12:43 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/white-house-encryptionconfide-app/.
34
Features, CONFIDE, https://getconfide.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2017).
35
Hancock, supra note 8.
36
Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Surveillance as Loss of Obscurity, 72 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1343, 1358 (2015).
37
Moore suggests an approach that recognizes parties’ privacy expectations and limits the scope
of discovery ordered by courts through a proportionality test, which would consider privacy
effects, the breadth of such requests, any potential chilling effect on potential litigants, and the
burden that producing such content would cause the parties. Jonathan E. Moore, Social Media
Discovery: It’s a Matter of Proportion, 31 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 403, 418-19 (2014).
32
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and impermanent messaging apps is to shield communications between people
from outside scrutiny by making them impossible to read or by making them
vanish. These core principles are in conflict, and current laws and policies regarding
government record-keeping and archiving are struggling to keep up with
communication technology that is growing in popularity among citizens and
government officials.
Here, three potential approaches policy makers could take are addressed,
each with its own legal and practical challenges: (1) Ban use of these apps by public
officials; (2) Enhance and adapt archiving demands already in place to address the
new technologies; and/or (3) Treat the companies that offer the technologies as
quasi-governmental agencies to make it possible to access the archives they
maintain.
A. Ban on Use of Encryption and Ephemeral Messaging Apps
One response could be a ban on use of encrypted and ephemeral messaging
apps, either through legislation or judicial action. Reports suggest the White House
cracked down on staffers using Signal and Confide to talk amongst themselves and
to journalists. Reports also noted that former White House press secretary Sean
Spicer considered the use of these apps for official communications a violation of
the Federal Records Act, though he did not publicly comment on whether using the
apps had been forbidden by the administration.38 The attorneys seeking an
injunction against Greitens similarly argued in favor of a ban on government
officials using apps that operate in direct conflict with the Missouri’s open records
law.
Greitens’s lawyers argued that such a ban on government employee speech
would trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Several courts recognize a First
Amendment right to use the Internet and social networks to communicate. This
recognition is particularly relevant for sex offenders who have challenged bars on
their access to social media. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized a
convicted sex offender’s First Amendment right to access the Internet in 2005,
striking down a provision of his release that would “completely bar his access to
computers and the Internet” as overly broad.39 Likewise, a federal district court in
Louisiana struck down Louisiana’s law barring sex offenders from “unlawful use
or access of social media” because it essentially served as “a near total ban on
38

Dylan Byers, Spicer Cracks Down on White House Leaks, CNN (last updated Feb. 27, 2017,
4:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/26/politics/spicer-leaks-crackdown/.
39
U.S. v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005).
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Internet access” that “unreasonably restricts many ordinary activities that have
become important to everyday life in today’s world.”40 The U.S. Supreme Court in
2017 struck down a North Carolina state law restricting access to “a commercial
social networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits
minor children to become members” in a case in which the defendant, a sex
offender, used Facebook.41 Recognizing the broad free speech interests in Internet
communications within the “fabric of our modern society and culture,” the Supreme
Court noted that “foreclos[ing] access to social media altogether prevents a citizen
from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights.” 42 The North
Carolina law was significantly narrower than provisions struck down by federal
courts in Louisiana43 and Nebraska,44 not covering social networking services that
provide only one service, such as photo sharing, e-mail, or instant messaging.45
One might expect that public officials would have no fewer rights under the
First Amendment than sex offenders to access social networks. An outright ban on
using a certain tool to communicate could operate as a prior restraint and may face
challenges by public officials asserting their free speech rights to use the
communication tools in an unofficial capacity. In Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White, the Supreme Court struck down the Minnesota Supreme Court’s canon of
conduct that limited speech about political or legal disputes of candidates for
judicial election, stating that the state could not overcome the strict scrutiny test in
its requirement that judicial candidates could not comment on legal or political
matters in the interest of maintaining judicial impartiality.46 Elected public officials
have relied on this ruling to argue that they have stronger First Amendment rights
than government employees making statements pursuant to their job duties. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized this in Rangra v. Brown,
finding protection for the speech of elected government officials “is robust and no
less strenuous than that afforded to the speech of citizens in general.”47
40

Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 607 (M.D. La. 2012).
State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738, 743-44 (N.C. 2015).
42
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 U.S. 1730, 1737-38 (2017).
43
Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596.
44
See Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F.Supp.2d 1086 (D. Neb. 2012).
45
Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 750.
46
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
47
Rangra v. Brown, 566 F.3d 515, 524 (5th Cir. 2009). The court found that the criminal
provisions of the Texas Open Meetings Act were “content-based regulations of speech that require
the state to satisfy the strict scrutiny test in order to uphold them.” Id. at 521. However, the same
court’s decision in Asgiersson v. Abbott four years later upheld the Texas Open Meetings Act from
a similar First Amendment challenge by government officials. See Asgeirsson v. Abbott, 696 F.3d
454 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1249 (2013). Scholars have argued that because open
meetings laws of this kind are content-based, they should be reviewed using strict scrutiny rather
41
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Compared to elected public officials, government employees have limited
First Amendment protection for their speech while on the job. In Garcetti v.
Ceballos, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected “the notion that the First Amendment
shields from discipline the expressions employees make pursuant to their
professional duties.”48 As such, communications sent in one’s official capacity via
encrypted or ephemeral messaging apps that would typically be covered by public
records laws would receive limited First Amendment protection. These are not the
acts of a government employee in his or her role as a citizen, an essential element
for asserting the First Amendment right in this context. These tools would not be
used in furtherance of the government employee’s “opportunit[y] to contribute to
public debate,” but rather to his or her conduct in official duties.49
Courts have allowed some restriction of public official speech in another
context – open meetings laws. Public officials in Texas challenged the criminal
provisions of the state’s Open Meetings Act50 on First Amendment grounds,
arguing that it “criminalizes all private speech among a quorum of a governing
body that is about public policy, even if such speech does not lead to corruption.”51
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument in Asgeirsson
v. Abbott, finding that the section criminalizing public officials’ potential Open
Meetings Act dodges was content-neutral, was not overbroad or vague, and
adequately supported the goals of public disclosure laws “such as increasing
transparency, fostering trust in government, and ensuring that all members of a
governing body may take part in a discussion of public business.”52 Similarly, state
legislatures have revised open meetings laws and state attorneys general have
issued rulings to clarify that certain uses of technology by public officials may
violate the law. Arizona, for instance, defines a meeting as a “gathering, in person
or through technological devices, of a quorum of a public body,”53 and the attorney
general has clarified that circumventing the Open Meetings Law by using email to
avoid a quorum or other aspects of the law “will subject the members of the public
body and others to sanctions.”54 In Florida, where meetings of two or more
members of a public body constitutes a meeting subject to the state’s Sunshine Law,
than intermediate scrutiny to allow some room for private discussion by public officials. See
Steven J. Mulroy, Sunshine’s Shadow: Overbroad Open Meetings Laws as Content-Based Speech
Restrictions Distinct from Disclosure Requirements, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 135 (2015).
48
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
49
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968).
50
Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 551.144 (West 2017).
51
Asgeirsson v. Abbott, 696 F.3d at 464.
52
Id.
53
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-431(4)(a) (effective Aug. 3, 2018).
54
Ariz. Att'y Gen. Op. 105-004, 1-2 (2005).

11

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET • VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2019
Killer Apps: Vanishing Messages, Encrypted Communications, and Challenges to
Freedom of Information Laws when Public Officials “Go Dark”
the attorney general opined that the use of computer-based technology by county
commissioners “to communicate among themselves on issues pending before the
board” would violate state law.55 A 2009 revision to the Massachusetts Open
Meeting Law limited remote participation in meetings by public officials, which
the attorney general advised included bans on participation via “text messaging,
instant messaging, email, and web chat without audio.”56
The logic of these limits on public official use of technology from attorney
general opinions and in the Asgeirsson case – that public officials’ free speech
rights may be suborned to serve the interest in transparent governance in statutes
that require disclosure – may plausibly extend to efforts to restrict government use
of certain technological tools that, even when used legally by a citizen, would allow
public officials to sidestep open records laws. This may be particularly true in the
case of ephemeral messaging apps such as Snapchat and Confide, which by default
make detection of their messages extremely difficult if not impossible. As Professor
Allison Stanger noted, “Since Confide is explicitly designed to eliminate a paper
trail, its use creates at least the appearance of misconduct, if not the reality.”57
While there may be theoretical value for a ban on public official use of
encrypted and ephemeral messaging apps, and even if such a ban would be
permissible under the First Amendment,58 it would have problems in practice. First,
not all government officials and employees will be using government-issued
devices to do work, making monitoring of device use difficult when government
employees use personal devices and the apps on them for both personal and work
purposes. While government agency heads may frown upon employees using their
own smartphones for work purposes in general,59 the Obama administration in 2012
acknowledged the reality of this practice, offering guidance to federal agencies to
help them develop “bring your own device” (BYOD) policies, noting employees’
“increased mobility and better integration of their personal and work lives” as well
as “the flexibility to work in a way that optimizes their productivity.” 60 Second, as
55

Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 89-39, 2 (1989).
MASS ATT’Y GEN., OPEN MEETING LAW GUIDE, 14 (Mar. 18, 2015),
http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/government/oml/oml-guide.pdf.
57
Newman, supra note 32.
58
One could imagine, for example, government employees arguing that a ban on using legal
messaging apps for government purposes would be broader than necessary to ensure the purpose
of transparency laws, particularly in light of the archiving requirements mentioned in the next
section, infra.
59
Amrita Jayakumar, Report: Government Agencies Don’t Like ‘Bring-Your-Own-Device’ Policy,
WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-it/report-governmentagencies-arent-thrilled-about-bring-your-own-device-policy/2015/04/28/715fc962-edc0-11e48abc-d6aa3bad79dd_story.html?utm_term=.223c1e25b43d.
60
THE WHITE HOUSE, DIGITAL SERV. ADVISORY GRP., BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE
56
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every teenager knows, hiding or quickly deleting apps on smartphones is not
difficult, making it possible for government employees to either install an app or
create secret folders making detection of the apps difficult.61 Spot checks such as
the one the White House spokesman conducted could be easily sidestepped for a
government staffer expecting such events. And third, more about wisdom than
practicality, is acknowledging that using encrypted and ephemeral messaging apps
may have benefits to providing better, more transparent government by providing
whistleblowers a more secure channel to contact journalists or advocates when they
want to report government abuse. After Garcetti, some legal scholars feared a
chilling effect on whistleblowers. As Drechsel noted, “[i]f government employees
can be disciplined without First Amendment limits for job-related speech,
government employers now have another tool to discourage, intimidate and punish
whistleblowers and leakers, as well as to control employees whose primary work is
public communication.”62 Drechsel considered the risk for public employees who
could be punished for speaking in ways critical of their government employers, thus
threatening the free flow of information. A ban on encrypted and ephemeral
messaging apps, enforceable by either legislated criminal penalties or judicial
contempt sanctions, would be a similar deterrent. Without GPG encryption, Edward
Snowden would have been subject to higher risk for detection when he leaked
records documenting government surveillance abuses; mobile apps that provide
similar avenues for government employees, while possibly subverting freedom of
information laws, may at the same time help with a different method of oversight.
As such, an outright ban on government employee use of encrypted and
ephemeral messaging apps would likely be permissible under First Amendment
limits of government employee speech, though it would present some practical and
policy challenges. The National Archives Records Administration (NARA), which
oversees federal records management including compliance with the Federal
Records and the Freedom of Information Act, has announced as much in its recordkeeping guidance, noting, “[s]imply prohibiting the use of electronic messaging
accounts to conduct agency business is difficult to enforce and does not

(Aug.23, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/digitalgov/bring-your-own-device.
61
See, e.g., Mike Wehner, How to Completely Hide Any App or Folder on Your iPhone or iPad,
ENGADGET (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.engadget.com/2014/03/26/how-to-completely-hide-anyapp-or-folder-on-your-iphone-or-ipad/; Ben Woods, How to Securely Hide Your Files and Apps
on Android, ANDROIDPIT (Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.androidpit.com/how-to-hide-your-filesand-apps-on-android.
62
Robert E. Drechsel, The Declining First Amendment Rights of Government News Sources: How
Garcetti v. Ceballos Threatens the Flow of Newsworthy Information, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 129,
139 (2011).

13

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET • VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2019
Killer Apps: Vanishing Messages, Encrypted Communications, and Challenges to
Freedom of Information Laws when Public Officials “Go Dark”
acknowledge the ways employees communicate.”63 A more palatable avenue to
manage government use of encrypted and ephemeral apps may instead be adapting
existing record-keeping and archiving plans to address these issues.
B. Adapt and Enhance Archiving Policies
In response to the widespread use of email for government purposes, state
and federal government agencies have outlined requirements for archiving emails,
either through modifications of freedom of information laws or agency policies.
Text messaging, on the other hand, has been a bit more problematic for records
management and archiving by government agencies.64 This presents potential
problems in the context of encrypted and ephemeral messaging apps, which are
essentially a form of text messaging made even more difficult to manage and
archive.
There is no question that text messages are covered by public records laws
at both the state and federal levels as a form of electronic communication, and the
use of personal devices does not alter the reach of public records laws to text
messages when they are used for government purposes. As Senat explained in his
examination of the application of public records laws to private ownership of
devices by government employees, most courts and attorneys general “have
rejected the notion that a government official’s ownership of a device is more
important than the substance of the information” that was being communicated on
that device.65 What matters is whether “official government business” is being
transacted on the device; if so, then the messages in question, regardless of format
or device ownership, are subject to public records laws.66
NARA detailed archiving and retention strategies for chat/instant
messaging, text messaging, voicemail messaging, and other messaging platforms
(including Snapchat and WhatsApp) in a bulletin sent to agency heads in 2015, with
the purpose of providing guidance for compliance with the Federal Records Act

63

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, BULLETIN 2015-02 (July 29, 2015),
https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/bulletins/2015/2015-02.html.
64
See Sandra F. Chance & Christina M. Locke, Struggling with Sunshine: Analyzing the Impact of
Technology on Compliance with Open Government Laws Using Florida as a Case Study, 21
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1 (2010); Cheryl Cooper, Sending the Wrong
Message: Technology, Sunshine Law, and the Public Record in Florida, 39 STETSON L. REV. 411
(2010).
65
Joey Senat, Whose Business Is It: Is Public Business Conducted on Officials’ Personal
Electronic Devices Subject to State Open Records Laws?, 19 COMM. L. & POL’Y 293, 322 (2014).
66
Id.
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and the Freedom of Information Act.67 This mandated agencies to have a records
schedule for deletion of electronic messages, with the warning that “unscheduled
records must be treated as permanent.” Additionally, the bulletin encouraged
agencies to “determine a minimum time frame to keep electronic messages” in a
“searchable and retrievable manner,” with the recognition that agencies would need
to do this regardless of whether the messaging system was in house or was created
by a third party.68 But the lengths of these schedules are unclear and vary based on
the kind and purpose of the record. In the context of emails, for example, NARA
has noted that schedules may allow for the immediate deletion of “transitory”
emails, while some agencies may retain emails “for decades and then transferred to
NARA for permanent preservation,” while in other cases, it may be appropriate for
an agency to retain emails for one year “to meet audit and access requirements.”69
As such, records retention policies at the federal level have created some
confusion. In 2016, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was audited after
a conservative watchdog and U.S. Representative Lamar Smith alleged that EPA
employees, including the top administrator, had improperly deleted thousands of
text messages about official business to avoid compliance with the Federal Records
Act and the Freedom of Information Act.70 The EPA’s Office of Inspector General
found that agency employees sent 3.1 million text messages over a 12-month period
on government-issued devices as well as uncountable numbers more on non-agency
devices that may also have been subject to federal records laws. 71 While the audit
did not find intentional wrongdoing on the part of EPA employees, it found several
problems with compliance, such as a lack of procedure for the agency’s “FOIA
personnel” or other staff to examine text messaging that may need to be retained as
a record on a regular basis, with such searches ranging from every 20 days to
“periodically (at least monthly).”72 Further, employee devices included defaults for
automatic text message deletion “after 30 days, one year, or forever,” with

NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., BULLETIN 2015-02 (July 29, 2015),
https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/bulletins/2015/2015-02.html.
68
Id.
69
NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., BULLETIN 2014-06 (Sept. 15, 2014),
https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/bulletins/2014/2014-06.html.
70
See Timothy Cama, GOP Chairman Subpoenas EPA on Texts, THE HILL (Mar. 25, 2015, 4:45
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/236955-gop-chairman-subpoenas-epa-on-texts.
71
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, CONGRESSIONALLY
REQUESTED AUDIT: EPA NEEDS TO IMPROVE PROCESSES FOR PRESERVING TEXT MESSAGES AS
FEDERAL RECORDS, Rep. No. 17-P-0062, 1-2 (Dec. 21, 2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/_epaoig_20161221-17-p-0062.pdf.
72
Id. at 9.
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employees varying in their settings, including one high-level administrator who
configured his government-issued phone to delete all texts after 30 days.73
Similar challenges are present at the state level, where records retention
schedules “vary greatly.”74 A review of email schedules in 2014, for example, noted
that Pennsylvania allows purging of state employee emails after five days, while
New York automatically deletes after 90 days, and North Carolina keeps all
executive branch emails for five years.75 An audit by a coalition of newspapers and
television stations in North Carolina revealed difficulties in receiving the text
messages reporters requested under the state’s Public Records Act in January 2017.
While all agencies responded and several provided records, some said their top
officials did not use text messaging, while others noted that they did not have
retention or archiving policies, including the state auditor. The authors concluded,
“it’s clear that getting access to those public records depends largely on the
goodwill of those department heads.”76 An audit by journalists of Florida agencies
in 2016 had similar results, showing some confusion among officials, as one city
attorney declared that text messages of public officials were not public records.
“Depending on what county (the public officials are) in, you may wait a long time
or pay a hefty fee to find out what they’ve typed. And even then, you have to trust
some when they say they didn’t send any texts,” the journalists explained.77
The current state of open records laws, at both the state and federal level,
reflects the difficulty in retaining and archiving government text messages, even
without considering the practical challenges presented by encrypted and ephemeral
messaging apps. In Texas, for example, the Library and Archives Commission sets
the state’s records retention schedules (RRS) as a guide for agencies to use in
establishing their own internal schedules, with required minimums for which
records must be kept before they may be destroyed or otherwise archived.78 The
default retention period is one year from the date a record is created, though the
73

Id. at 16-17.
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Government Works, NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 13, 2017, 8:11 PM),
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article138062978.html.
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(Mar. 10, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article65529447.html.
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TEXAS STATE LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES COMMISSION, TEXAS STATE RECORDS RETENTION
SCHEDULE, 4TH ED. (Aug. 31, 2016),
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RRS are somewhat vague about this, noting that “transitory information” such as
electronic communications should be retained “until the purpose of the record has
been fulfilled,” and mentions nothing specifically about text messages or
messaging applications.79 The level of detailed guidance that would need to be
provided to a Capstone-like coordinator or records custodian in each government
office would need to be greatly enhanced in order to adequately capture and retain
difficult records such as ephemeral messages on Snapchat and Confide, or
managing encrypted messaging services such as WhatsApp.
At the federal level, the NARA suggested following the “Capstone
Approach” that it developed in 2013 to address email retention of federal agencies,
which allows agencies to rely more on automation and to create schedules for
retention and archiving based on the “work and/or position” of each government
employee.80 For example, an agency could designate that messages from “the
accounts of officials at the top of an agency or an organizational subcomponent” be
retained permanently, while messages of lower-level employees may be kept for a
shorter period of time.81 This approach potentially shifts the burden to individual
account holders and their staffers to self-report and monitor their own compliance
as each agency determines through its own policy. One practical approach for
agencies would be to create policies in which employees must voluntarily disclose
which messaging apps they use, both on their government-issued and personal
devices, and that records custodians or other staffers charged with oversight set up
schedules for regular backup and archiving of those texts. In the case of encrypted
messaging, the policy could require that the records custodian be provided the keys,
which could be used to decrypt any messaging for review and release upon a proper
open records request.
However, this does not entirely get around the problems uncovered in the
state audits in North Carolina and Florida – reliance on the good faith behavior of
public officials to comply with records retention and release policies that are poorly
defined and have little consequence for non-compliance. Actions such as the 2016
investigation into the EPA and the House Oversight Committee’s requests to
federal agency heads to document agency policies on retention of messaging will
put pressure on agencies to comply. The emergence of encrypted and ephemeral
messaging apps makes such oversight difficult, particularly if the apps are being
used by public employees deliberately to hide from public scrutiny.
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As such, while enhanced electronic records management and archiving
rules should certainly be encouraged to ensure that government communications
are available under state and federal freedom of information laws, relying on these
policies to overcome the aforementioned obstacles threatens to fall short of the
laws’ transparency goals. And while reasonable oversight policies may be put in
place for archiving and releasing encrypted messaging, the records management
policies mentioned above still do not provide a practical way to handle archiving
of disappearing messages in ephemeral apps. To tackle that problem, one possible
solution may be to place a greater burden on third-party service providers.
C. Treat App Developers as Quasi-Governmental Entities
Freedom of information laws generally include some provision that extends
transparency principles to private entities that serve government functions, though
there is a lot of variance in the extent to which such quasi-governmental entities are
covered. In general, a purely private business is not subject to public records laws;
instead, the laws require some nexus between the private entity and the government,
usually involving a level of government funding and function performed by the
entity. The growth in privatization of services often provided by government that
are now assigned out to private contractors – such as bus services for public schools,
security and imprisonment of inmates, and fundraising for public universities – has
led to conflicts over attempts to access the records created by those entities while
doing government-like work.82
To be clear, there is not currently a valid legal argument to be made that
developers of ephemeral messaging apps are subject to state or federal open records
laws as a quasi-governmental agency. However, the theory underpinning these laws
– that private entities providing important services to government that would
typically be performed by government may be subject to open records laws – could
be adopted by legislators to provide an avenue for public oversight of government
communication that is otherwise difficult, if not impossible, for reasons mentioned
in the previous sections of this article. Shifting the burden of oversight to the entity
with easier access to these records – the companies themselves – on the theory that
they are acting in a limited quasi-governmental capacity may fill some of the gap
in access laws and regulations.

See Rani Gupta, Privatization v. The Public’s Right to Know, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR
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The key elements that access laws typically require to establish that an
entity is serving in a quasi-governmental role are, to put it simply, function and
funding. The entity must be performing some kind of government-related task, and
the government must be providing financial support to the entity.83 In a broad sense,
ephemeral messaging apps may be considered to be serving a government function
by enabling a certain kind of privacy-protecting communication otherwise
unavailable through official government channels such as email systems. Consider
public officials who use private email services. For example, when she was
governor of Alaska, Sarah Palin was found to have been using two personal Yahoo
email accounts to conduct government business in a way that unlawfully
sidestepped the state’s open records laws.84 In this situation, the relationship
between the email service user and the provider did not automatically turn the
provider into a quasi-governmental agency. Rather, the government agency
responding to a request processed it by receiving the emails in question from the
providers and screening them before release. Regardless, the materials were in the
possession of a non-government third party, which made retrieval more difficult.
That said, private email service providers are not a perfect parallel for
ephemeral messaging services such as Snapchat and Confide, which do not conduct
the same kind of archiving. In its guidance to law enforcement agencies that may
be seeking access to Snaps, Snapchat notes that “we delete each Snap from our
servers once all recipients have viewed it,” and unopened messages are deleted after
30 days, unless users put the content in their “Memories” folder for preservation.85
Even the metadata about Snapchat messages – that is, logs of messages sent and
received, which do not include the actual content – are only retained for 31 days by
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Snapchat.86 Confide merely notes that it may be required to disclose account
information “in response to lawful requests by public authorities” or otherwise to
“court orders and subpoenas,” without any more detail about its retention policies
or ability of law enforcement to obtain content or metadata from communications.87
However, despite these attempts to guarantee users that messages and photos sent
through the ephemeral services will disappear permanently, people have found
ways to hack into Snapchat, leading to massive privacy breaches. Snapchat settled
a dispute with the Federal Trade Commission in 2014 involving lax security that
allowed people to use third-party apps to infiltrate Snapchat photos and videos,
which specifically enabled people to take screenshots and store them without the
sender’s knowledge.88 While that settlement was ongoing, Snapchat was hit by
hackers who published nearly 100,000 photos that users expected had
disappeared.89 Snapchat said that this was not a result of hackers accessing their
servers, but rather use of third-party apps that were not allowed under its Terms of
Use.90 If hackers are able to find ways to infiltrate an ephemeral messaging app to
make its messages permanent, it is certainly possible that government records
custodians could work with the company on a legal solution to do the same for
public records purposes, or that the company could anticipate such requests and
provide more thorough archiving services in certain situations.
Recognizing a limited quasi-governmental relationship when government
employees use ephemeral messaging services would help enable such solutions.
However, it would require legislation as, typically, these laws have been found not
to extend to private bodies without substantial connections between the business
and the government. In one high-profile case, Texas law deemed not-for-profit
collegiate athletic associations were not “governmental bod[ies],” which include
“the part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission,
committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part
by public funds.”91 Interpreting what at the time was called the Texas Open Records
Act, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to extend the definition
of “government body” to the NCAA or the Southwest Conference in connection
86
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with records requests made to those institutions regarding football recruiting
violations at Southern Methodist University.92 While the court found that “gate
receipts and television revenue paid” to the NCAA and the Southwest Conference
were “public funds,” it did not find that the funds extended beyond “specific,
measurable services” typical of a normal quid-pro-quo contract.93
Open records laws typically also require private businesses to have a close
connection to the government body, which would not be the case for encrypted and
ephemeral messaging apps absent additional legislation. For instance, a “non-profit
corporation that provides emergency medical transportation services” such as
ambulance and helicopter flights was found not to be a “government body” under
the Texas Public Information Act. Even though the company received public funds,
the threshold the court applied was whether the relationship is such that the
company is “so closely associated with the governmental body that the private
entity falls within” the act. In this case, the court found that the relationship was an
arms-length contract with sufficient quid pro quo, and as such was merely an
exchange of payment for services rather than establishing the company as a
“government body” for public records purposes.94
While establishing a private entity as doing a public function may be
somewhat difficult, funding is perhaps even more so, and a problematic one for
policymakers who may be interested in extending the theory of quasi-government
operations to external communication services.
The funding of a quasi-government entity typically does not have to be
entirely from the state. For instance, the Indiana Supreme Court found that the
Indianapolis Convention and Visitors Association, a “private not-for-profit
corporation that receives revenue from both public and private sources,” was a
public entity “subject to the Indiana Access to Public Records Act.”95 The law was
drafted broadly to allow public inspection of records of an entity if it is funded in
whole or in part through public funds or tax appropriations, thus making it subject
to audit by the State Board of Accounts. But the court made it clear that a “fee-forservices” arrangement would not have been enough to make the association subject
to the Public Records Law.96 If an entity is merely performing a service as part of
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an arms-length negotiated contract, it is usually not enough to establish the entity
as quasi-governmental and subject to open records laws.97
Because the government does not fund developers of encrypted and
ephemeral messaging developers, they are not subject to current public records
laws. Ephemeral messaging apps are services that are free for anyone with a
smartphone to download and use, at least on a small scale. Snapchat is free for
users, and derives its funding from both advertising and from providing
opportunities for users to engage with brands.98 The basic services of Confide are
free for individual and small group users, with limited fee-based services (such as
message retraction and priority support). They also offer a “pro” version for larger
groups and businesses, which costs $15 per user per month, and even a variablypriced solution for large organizations.99 Unless government agencies took the
unlikely step of paying for these kinds of services, there would not constitute the
type of financial support typically required to make private entities subject to open
records laws on a quasi-government theory. Even then, if the government were
merely contracting out a service for payment, it would still not likely establish that
the entity was acting in a quasi-governmental capability.
As such, at both the levels of function and funding, the theory of quasigovernmental activity allowing public records law access to ephemeral messaging
apps is dubious, unless legislators or policymakers were to consider targeted
revisions that would allow such access by necessity. Such a move would necessarily
require both that the ephemeral messaging developers maintain an archive for
accounts operated by government employees and would require special access,
either by the records custodians or direct request from the public, to facilitate
inspection and copying of those records. The approach would also have to be very
narrow to avoid security lapses and risks for abuse by government investigators.
One potential example in limiting the scope of access to records held by third
parties is Pennsylvania’s Right to Know Law, which provides a means of access to
“a public record that is not in the possession of the agency but is in the possession
of a party with whom the agency has contracted to perform a governmental function
on behalf of the agency, and which directly relates to the function of the government
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agency.”100 The Pennsylvania law is limited only to those records that are of a
government nature, not to all records in possession of the third party.101 Requests
for records go to the agency, which if it determines if the record is open, and
consequently, if it must acquire copies from the third party to pass on to the
requester.102
Efforts by legislators to require mandatory archiving by private companies
have been met with resistance. The European Union attempted to do this through
the Directive on Mandatory Retention of Communications Traffic Data in 2006,
which would have required member states to adopt guidelines for electronic
communication companies to retain data for six months to two years “for the
purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime.”103 In
2014, the European Court of Justice struck down the data retention directive,
finding it infringed privacy rights of citizens and did not provide sufficient
safeguards to prevent against abuse and unlawful access of the data.104
Another possibility would be legislation which requires apps to have a
“government user mode” that would automatically retain such users’ texts in their
archives, with the app creator acting as a quasi-government operator subject to state
or federal freedom of information laws. Yet another possibility, from a proactive
transparency perspective, would be legislation that requires communication app
developers to build in a feature that automatically synchronizes communications to
or from government employees105 to the state or federal agency records custodian
or archiving service for retention, in line with the “Capstone Approach” outlined in
the previous section.

CONCLUSION
When Utah was in the process of revising its Government Records Access
and Management Act in 2011, one of its more controversial provisions was closing
access to private text messages and instant messages of public officials. Charles
Davis, at the time the director of the National Freedom of Information Coalition,
100
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called it a “lobbyist’s fantasy,” expecting to have a conversation such as, “give me
your cell phone number, Mr. Legislator, and we can have a private text conversation
24/7, even if you’re on the floor.”106 The absurdity of such a possibility was just
one reason open government advocates and others rallied against the revised law,
which was repealed just weeks after it was enacted.107
The “lobbyist’s fantasy” scenario remains a possibility under any state or
federal open records law, though such laws make it clear that those text messages
must be archived and available for public inspection, and record-keeping policies
have been adjusted to adapt to the technology with moderate success. But what
options do government agencies have when dealing with messages that are
encrypted and vanish by default, leaving no trace that a communication ever
happened in the first place? The “lobbyist’s fantasy” is a reality that open
government advocates must contend with when dealing with encrypted and
ephemeral messaging services.
None of the three policy approaches examined here seem to provide an easy
solution. A ban on government use of encrypted and ephemeral messaging apps—
even if it is deemed constitutionally viable under the First Amendment because it
is necessary to ensure transparency—faces practical enforcement challenges that
are common to public records and meetings laws.108 Modifying existing archiving
and record-keeping policies is a potentially viable solution, especially regarding
encryption should a custodian be required to keep keys and decrypted copies of
messages routinely. Successfully enacting such policies, however, relies on
voluntary compliance and cooperation by the very same government employees
who may be using encrypted and ephemeral messaging apps to cover their tracks
or otherwise dodge oversight required by freedom of information laws. Extending
a theory of quasi-governmental action to app developers—which is not currently
valid as a legal argument and would thus require legislative action to shift the
burden of record-keeping and archiving to the companies providing encrypted and
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ephemeral messaging services—also faces substantial practical hurdles, not the
least of which is the fact that the companies themselves try to protect their users’
privacy by rapidly deleting messages and metadata from their own servers.
Ephemeral messaging solutions are, indeed, potentially the killer apps of freedom
of information laws. As Confide notes in its messaging to customers, the app was
created “to bring off-the-record professional communication to the digital
world.”109 Undermining public records laws is a side effect of their success.
So, what’s the answer? As legal scholar Orin Kerr quipped on Twitter,
“Most underused answer in law: ‘I don’t know.’”110 Each of the three
aforementioned options may offer some guidance to legislators and policy-makers
trying to uphold the spirit of public records laws. Doing nothing is, perhaps, the
worst option because it allows the “lobbyist’s fantasy” scenario to advance
unchecked. The best solution may be educating the public, including government
officials, about the underlying purpose of freedom of information laws and their
role in democracy. While compliance with open records laws is historically spotty
at best, what compliance there is may have less to do with fear of the largely
ineffective enforcement mechanisms and more to do with the expected behavior of
public officials in American democracy. We seem to be in a moment when these
democratic norms that have compelled certain behaviors are being tested, if not
entirely cast aside. If the law does not compel release of government records, at the
serious risk of a forceful penalty, then the request for the documents in question
may go ignored. The shift to a culture of consequence-free lack of compliance with
open records laws, somewhat reflective of the infamous Ashcroft Memo issued in
2001 that promised Department of Justice backing for any federal agency that
denied access,111 emboldens those in government who would keep its citizens in
the dark through deliberate subversion of the law through use of encryption and
impermanent messaging apps.
A better approach may be adopting a strategy similar to the federal email
“Capstone Approach” to management of communication apps and accounts on
personal and government-issued devices, which is revised for the technology at
hand. A combination of limited bans on use of ephemeral messaging apps by public
officials, as well as enhanced record keeping guidelines and a legislated archiving
requirement along the lines of the quasi-governmental theory offered above could
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work together to ensure citizen access to otherwise vanishing government records.
Current federal agency approaches have already proven problematic in managing
non-ephemeral text messaging, so extending this to the state and to ephemeral or
encrypted messaging may present even greater challenges.
Encryption is not a bad thing in itself; neither is ephemeral messaging. Both
of these tools promise privacy and provide citizens a greater ability to discuss
matters with more security against government intrusion or surveillance, a value
that enhances the free exchange of ideas in democratic society. While there are
valuable government uses of these technologies, there are also problematic ones
that will require complex law and policy discussions to resolve. In this article, the
author attempted to begin some of those discussions to lead toward the creation
workable solution in the future.
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